Last week I posted Diplomacy: The Alexander Rules, an effort to revise the rules of Diplomacy to coherently eliminate the ambiguities and paradoxes which still linger in its strategically rich depths.

In an act of synchronicity, shortly after posting the Alexander Rules, I promptly discovered that Archive.org has assembled a truly massive collection of Diplomacy zines. Hundreds — possibly thousands — of fan publications drawn from across four decades of activity, including Diplomacy World, Comrades in Arms, Graustark, Spring Offensive, and dozens of others.

It’s an astonishing treasure trove of historical curiosity, nascent game theory, and actual game play that stands as a testimony to the incredible legacy of Allan B. Calhamer’s classic game.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE SPIRE

Session 4A: Riot in Oldtown

In which a cry for freedom takes an unexpectedly sinister turn, the scope of events becomes larger than can immediately be managed, and Master Ranthir performs astonishing deeds of derring-do…

As with the rules for handling house fires that we talked about a couple of weeks ago, I created a custom structure for handling the riot in this week’s installment of the campaign journal. And I similarly posted them here on the Alexandrian back in 2007. They’ve actually got much wider applications than just riots, and you can find them here: Crowd Rules.

BUILDING A RIOT

Although the group’s decision of what to do next is presented at the beginning of this entry in the campaign journal, I had actually asked them that question at the end of the previous session. (As a I talk about in the Railroading Manifesto, one of the most potent tools in the GM’s arsenal is simply asking, “What are you planning to do next session?”) So I knew that the PCs would be present for the riot, which by its very nature was going to be a big set piece.

Successfully pulling off big set pieces at the table can be tricky. By definition, they involve a lot of moving parts and managing all of those parts can be a bit of a juggling act. The secret, in my experience, is clearly organizing all of those parts into distinct tools which you can then easily pick up and use on-the-fly. For this particular scene, I prepped several tools.

First, a general timeline of events as they would play out if the PCs didn’t interfere with Helmut’s plans. (See “Goal-Oriented Opponents” in Don’t Prep Plots, and also the detailed example of doing this sort of thing at a larger scale.)

Second, the relevant stat blocks for the Riot Mobs (the large crowd was broken into 8 mobs) and the City Watch.

Third, Helmut’s speech. Using big speeches like this at the gaming table can be tricky. Being able to deliver them effectively and dramatically helps, of course (I’ve literally trained professionally for this, so I have an advantage). But the real trick is making sure that they don’t deprotagonize the PCs.

You know those video game cut scenes where all you want to do as a player is pull the trigger and shoot the idiot who’s yammering on? Right. That’s exactly what you want to avoid here. At the gaming table you’ve got the advantage that your players actually can interrupt what you’re saying and declare that they’re taking an action. But it can also be useful to take a more proactive approach as a GM, which is what I did here: The timeline of events was specifically designed to overlap the speech and, as you can see represented in the journal entry, the speech was broken down into chunks between which actions could be taken. (So, for example, Helmut would speak for a bit and then I’d call for Spot checks to let people notice the guards moving towards the stage.)

THE FEAR OF RAILROADS

Something that isn’t represented in the campaign journal is the point where one of the players declared that everything happening had been foreordained and there was nothing they could do about it — i.e., that they were being railroaded.

Which was a weird moment. First, it had been their choice to attend the riot in the first place. Second, as we’ve seen, the whole encounter had been structured to insure that the PCs could take action and influence the outcome of the event. Third, the PCs had been taking actions in an effort to affect the mob… they were just failing. The specific moment which triggered the comment was, oddly, when Dominic tried to calm the crowd down… and rolled a 2 on his Diplomacy check. His failure could not more clearly have been the result of pure mechanical resolution.

And yet the conclusion was reached that they were stuck in a railroad.

This was one in sequence of events which led me inexorably to an unfortunate truth: Railroading is a form of abuse.

I recognize the hyperbolic nature of the claim. And I’m not saying that people who are railroaded actually suffer emotional damage. But within the specific context of the game table, the behavior modification is remarkably similar: Railroaded players become hyper-aware of the GM’s behavior, constantly looking for the cues that indicate the railroad is coming. Their response will be to take actions to minimize the damage of the railroad — either acceding to it so that they don’t have to be manhandled into it; or becoming disruptive in an effort to resist it.

And this is where the analogy becomes useful, because this behavior modification persists even after the player is no longer threatened by the railroad: They continue looking for the subtle cues that warn them the railroad is coming. But when those cues occur in the absence of railroading, their behavior becomes seemingly erratic and irrational. (Why are they randomly shooting people in the head? Why are they just blindly doing whatever an NPC asks them to do, even when it’s clearly not in their best interest and they’re endlessly complaining about it?) This can be baffling and confusing for the GM who doesn’t understand what’s happening. (And it can be even more difficult for a GM who is trying to improve themselves and stop their previous railroading tendencies.)

Having identified the problem, what’s the solution? Unfortunately, I don’t think there’s an easy one to be had. A frank conversation in the metagame where you make it clear that the outcomes in your game aren’t predetermined and that the players are in control of their own destinies can be useful. Beyond that, the best you can do is to keep running your game: When they see that their actions have a meaningful impact — when they realize that the entire course of a campaign can be radically diverted by the simplest of moments and the smallest of choices — they’ll figure it out.

And although that will take time, it will be worth it in the end.

IN THE SHADOW OF THE SPIRE

SESSION 4A: RIOT IN OLDTOWN

April 7th, 2007
The 18th Day of Amseyl in the 790th Year of the Seyrunian Dynasty

The party decided that Ranthir should continue his research at the Delver’s Guild Library. The rest of them would head to the Republican rally scheduled to start in just a couple of hours.

On the way back up to Oldtown they finished selling the rest of the gear (with Elestra heading into the Bull and Bear Armory to avoid any further repercussions from Tee’s bad run-in with Iltumar the day before).

After dropping Ranthir off at the Delver’s Guild Library, the party continued down Dalenguard Road, discovering that the Administration Building (where the rally was being held) was only a few blocks away. A large platform had been erected in front of the pool in the center of the courtyard before the building. Only a few people milled about – the group was about an hour early for the rally itself.

The group split up: Agnarr headed up to a position parallel from the platform, planning to keep an eye on the crowd. Dominic and Elestra headed to the opposite side, standing near the edge of Dalenguard Road. Tee kept a look-out for Phon, suspecting that she might attend the rally.

Tee was right. About twenty minutes before the rally was scheduled to start – after a relatively large crowd of a couple hundred people had gathered – Tee saw Phon coming up Dalenguard Road from the east. Tee went over to her and waved, receiving a friendly smile and wave in response. After chatting amicably for awhile, Tee said that she’d like to keep an eye on Phon during the rally, just to make sure she was safe. Phon was glad to hear it, but suggested that – since the rally was about to begin – they should get a place near the front.

Just then, a shorter man – barrel-chested and with thinning hair, wearing fancy robes of black and silver – emerged from the Administration Building. Accompanied by two other men, with whom he chatted and laughed, he strode up to the platform, raised his hands, and cried out: “Friends! This is a momentous day! This is the day that you hear the truth of brotherhood and freedom!” The crowd settled down. Read more »

Martin Tegelj has posted the third installment in his ambitious adaptation of Doctor Who: The Temporal Masters. Check it out:

Part 3: Dawn of the Temporal Masters

Back in 2000-2001 I developed what I can comfortably described as an obsession with Diplomacy. Much of what you’ll read below was written in April 2001 and, if my younger self did his job (which I believe he did), should fully explain why — following my in-depth study of the game — I came to the conclusion that a revised rulebook for the game was necessary. Although these rules received a limited dissemination during the spring and summer of 2001, this is the first time they’ve been made widely and commonly available. (If you’d prefer to cut to the chase, click here to download the PDF.)

In the words of The Diplomacy Player’s Technical Guide: “Diplomacy merits such a body of game laws as chess has: One that is clean, clear, consistent, comprehensible, conventional, concrete, concise, complete, discrete, finite, playable, unambiguous, standard, traditional, elegant, firm, precise, and logically whole.”

The Alexander Rules are designed to provide such a set of rules.

It is an unfortunate reality that the rules of Diplomacy – as published by Allan B. Calhamer, Games Research, Avalon Hill, and Hasbro – have always contained ambiguities and inconsistencies: Situations in which a “correct and consistent” adjudication by the rules (i.e., an adjudication which will be identical from one Gamemaster or Judge to the next) is impossible.

HISTORY OF THE DIPLOMACY RULES

For the casual student, the extant rules for Diplomacy (as published in America) are:

D1959
GR1961
GR1971
AH1976
AH1982
AH1992
H1999
H1999 (computer)
H2000
WOTC2008

The D1959 rules are the original rules as published by Allan B. Calhamer. When Games Research, Inc. acquired the rights to the game in 1961 they published their own rulebook (GR1961) – which was, in all ways, identical to the 1959 rulebook except for typographical design and lay-out.

The rules were first revised by Games Research, Inc. ten years later. A team consisting of Rod Walker, Steve Marion, John McCallum, John Boardman, and others was commissioned to work with Allan Calhamer. The result was the GR1971 rulebook. This rulebook reorganized the entire rule set, introducing the idea of numbering and naming each rule individually. The rulebook clarified a number of concepts and introduced rule XII.5: A Convoyed Attack Does Not Protect the Convoying Fleets. This rule was an attempt to resolve first order paradoxes (see below).

When Avalon Hill acquired Diplomacy in 1976, they published their own rulebook (AH1976). This rulebook was identical to the GR1971 rulebook, but bore a new copyright date.

Six years later, in 1982, Avalon Hill released a revised ruleset. Known as the 1982 or “2^nd Edition” rulebook (despite the fact it was really the third edition of the published game), this rulebook (AH1982) again offered revisions in an attempt to create a more consistent ruleset. Notably, rule XII.5 was changed to: A Convoyed Attack Does Not Cut Certain Supports (this rule was an attempt to resolve second order paradoxes) and rule XII.6: Both a Convoy and an Overland Route was added (this rule was an attempt to stop the “kidnapped army” ambiguity).

Avalon Hill revised the rulebook a second time in 1992, resulting in the AH1992 (3^rd Edition) rulebook. These rules were, essentially, identical to the AH1982 rulebook, but there were editorial changes designed to clarify the distinction between a Move order, a Support order, and a Convoy order. These editorial changes resulted in an alteration in the numbering and naming of the rules – meaning that referring to a rule by the numerical scheme was no longer practical unless you specified the rulebook you were referring to. (As a result, most players in the Diplomacy community continue to use the 1982 references and ignored the 1992 rulebook.)

Avalon Hill was sold to Hasbro in the late 1990’s. Under Hasbro’s ownership, a new edition of Diplomacy was released in 1999 with a completely revised rulebook (H1999). This rulebook, also known as the 4^th Edition, was aimed firmly at the neophyte, illustrated with copious examples and explanative text. Unfortunately, in an effort to make the rules accessible to a family audience, the H1999 rulebook sacrificed precision, ease of use, and consistency: The numerical ordering of the rules was abandoned, the rules were badly broken up by the examples without clear reference, and the second and (under some interpretations) first order paradoxes were reintroduced to the ruleset. On the other hand, the H1999 rules did include the first clear resolution of the “kidnapped army” ambiguity.

At the same time that Hasbro released its revised edition of Diplomacy, it also released a CD-ROM version of the game. The CD-ROM game shipped with its own rulebook (referred to as the H1999 computer rulebook), which differed from the H1999 rulebook in only one regard: It did not include a clear resolution of the “kidnapped army” ambiguity, and – in fact – took a step backward here, as well, to the 1976 rules.

Hasbro has also released a H2000 rulebook, differentiated from the H1999 rulebook only by the copyright date. A third version of this rulebook, published by wizards of the coast, was released in 2008 with no significant changes (although the name of the Build Phase had been changed to the “Gaining and Losing Units Phase”).

So, in general, it is safe to say that there have been five versions of the rulebook:

D1959/GR1961 (Original Edition)
GR1971/AH1976 (1^st Edition)
AH1982 (2^nd Edition)
AH1992 (3^rd Edition)
H1999/H2000/WOTC2008 (4^th Edition)

With a minor variation of the 4^th Edition for the CD-ROM edition of the game.

AMBIGUITIES

Ambiguities are situations in which the rules are unclear. There are two possible outcomes of adjudication, but the discrepancy is caused because the meaning of the rules is unclear. If the meaning of the rules were clear, then no discrepancy would exist.

THE COASTAL CRAWL: In the original edition of the game, the definition of a “space” was not as clearly defined as it is today. As a result, one interpretation of the rules postulated that, for example, the north coast and the south coast were two separate provinces, allowing:

F Por-Spa (nc)
F Spa (sc)-Por

Calhamer explicitly did not desire that this move – known as the “coastal crawl” – should be legal. As a result, the 1971 revision of the rules clarified the definition of spaces and disallowed the coastal crawl.

MULTIPLE CONVOY ROUTES: Under the original rules it was entirely unclear how multiple, legitimate convoy routes should be handled. For example:

A Tun-Nap
F Ion C A Tun-Nap
F Tyn C A Tun-Nap

Should such an order be disallowed because it “admits of two meanings”? If it is allowed, should the army be allowed to move to Tunis if one (but not both) convoys are disrupted? In the 1971 revision, rule XII.4 (Ambiguous Convoy Routes) allowed the orders, but stated that “if any of the possible routes are destroyed by dislodgment of a fleet, the army may not move”.

This, however, created new problems. Now all a foreign power needed to do to prevent a convoy was to order an alternate convoy and then arrange for its own fleet to be dislodged. So the 2^nd Edition reversed course, replacing rule XII.4 with “More Than One Convoy Route: If the orders as written permit more than one route by which the convoyed army could proceed from its source to its destination, the order is not void on account of this ambiguity; and the army is not prevented from moving due to dislodgment of fleets, unless all routes are disrupted.”

KIDNAPPED ARMY: Another problem with convoys were “kidnapped armies”. Here an army in a coastal province is attempting to move into an empty, adjacent coastal province. A foreign power slyly orders a convoy for the unit, and then arranges for the convoy to be disrupted. Now, it seemed, the army no longer moved – because their convoy had been disrupted (rule XII.3).

The 2^nd Edition rulebook attempted to correct this problem with rule XII.6: “Both a Convoy Route and an Overland Route: If an army could arrive at its destination either overland or by convoy, one route must be considered and the other disregarded, depending upon the intent as shown by the totality of the orders written by the player governing the army.”

The problem is that rule XII.6 amounted to absolutely nothing. What does “shown by the totality of the orders written by the player governing the army” mean, exactly?

This problem remained uncorrected until the 4^th Edition of the rules, where an unnumbered rule reads: “If at least one of the convoying Fleets belongs to the player who controls the Army, then the convoy is used. The land route is disregarded. If none of the convoying Fleets belong to the player who controls the army, then the land route is used. However, the player controlling the army can use the convoy route if he/she indicated ‘via convoy’ on the Army move order in question.” (pg. 15)

This, however, is the rule which was dropped for the H1999 computer version of the manual, because the CD-ROM game offered no mechanic by which “via convoy” could be indicated. The H1999 computer version of the manual states that “if either the overland route or the convoy route is valid, then the Army will move to its destination”.

Note that both of these rules resolves the ambiguity in a different fashion.

BRANNAN’S RULE: Brannan’s Rule was an early house rule which attempted to solve first order paradoxes (see below). It was named after Steve Cartier (aka Dan Brannan), and stated: “The army in a convoyed attack is deemed to come from the space occupied by the last convoying fleet.” The primary intended effect of this rule was to make it impossible for a convoyed attack to cut a support directed against a convoying fleet.

However, Brannan’s Rule has a couple of undesirable side-effects: If the army is coming from the space occupied by the last convoying fleet, then the army is occupying that space at the same time as the fleet (something which the rules expressly forbid at all times).

Allan Calhamer disagreed with Brannan’s Rule, and in the 1971 revision an alternate solution was found to first order paradoxes (which specifically prevented the convoy from cutting a support against itself).

The rules, however, have never clearly stated that a convoyed attack comes from the army’s original province – which means that the ambiguity of the issue crops up from time to time.

PARADOXES

Unlike ambiguities, the problem of paradoxes cannot be resolved by clarifying the rules. In most cases, the rules are crystal clear: The problem of the paradoxical situation is that it admits itself to two different resolutions under the rules. In order to correct a paradox, the rules must be changed or amended.

FIRST ORDER PARADOXES: The simplest of the paradoxes involves a convoyed attack cutting the support of an attack which would, otherwise, disrupt the convoy:

England: F Lon S F Wal-ENG
England: F Wal-ENG

France: A Bre-ENG-Lon
France: F ENG C A Bre-Lon

Under the original rules of the game, this situation could not be adjudicated: If the convoy succeeds, then the support is cut and the convoy succeeds. If the support is not cut, then the convoy fails and the support is not cut.

In the AH1976 rules, this was corrected with rule XII.5: “A Convoyed Attack Does Not Protect the Convoying Fleets: If a convoyed army attacks a fleet which is supporting a fleet which is attacking one of the convoying fleets, the support is not cut.”

Now the adjudication is clear: The support of F Lon is not cut and the attack on ENG by F Wal succeeds, dislodging F Bre and disrupting the convoy.

SECOND ORDER PARADOXES: But that didn’t solve all the problems:

France: A Bre-ENG-Lon
France: F ENG C A Bre-Lon

England: F Lon S F Edi-NTH
England: F Edi-NTH

Russia: A Nwy-NTH-Bel
Russia: F NTH C A Nwy-Bel

Germany: F Bel S F Pic-ENG
Germany: F Pic-ENG

Do both convoys succeed or are both convoys disrupted because both convoys succeed?

Another revision of the rules was in order, and in AH1982 it was provided with a rewrite of rule XII.5: “A Convoyed Attack Does Not Cut Certain Supports: If a convoyed army attacks a fleet which is supporting an action in a body of water; and that body of water contains a convoying fleet, that support is not cut.”

Unfortunately, this new rule had side effects – altering adjudications in situations where there had been no problem. And, worse yet, the result could almost certainly be described as wholly illogical in those actions:

England: F IRI-MAT
England: F ENG S F IRI-MAT

France: F Spa (nc) S F MAT
France: F MAT C A Por-Bre
France: F Por-MAT-Bre

Italy: F GOL C A Tus-Spa
Italy: A Tus-GOL-Spa

Under the 1976 rules, Italy’s attack on Spain would cut the support and result in the disruption of the convoy through the Mid-Atlantic. Under the 1982 rules, Italy’s attack on Spain has no effect at all. Worse yet, if you add:

Italy: A Mar S A Tus-GOL-Spa

France’s fleet in Spain is actually dislodged, but still offers support under the 1982 rules.

PANDIN’S PARADOX: Plus, the 1982 rule didn’t resolve all the paradoxes. Pandin’s Paradox results from orders like these:

France: A Bre-ENG-Lon
France: F ENG C A Bre-Lon

England: F Lon S F Wal-ENG
England: F Wal-ENG

Germany: F NTH S F Bel-ENG
Germany: F Bel-ENG

Ignoring the effects of the convoy, the attacks on the English Channel from England and Germany are equally supported – which means that France’s fleet in the English Channel would not be dislodged due to the beleaguered garrison rule. But now take the effects of the convoy into account: If the convoy succeeds, then it cuts London’s support, which means that England’s and Germany’s attack on the channel are no longer equally supported, which means that the fleet is dislodged, which means that the convoy is disrupted. Paradox.

DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF THE ALEXANDER RULES

The Alexander rules are designed to be:

Clear: The meaning of a rule is never vague or uncertain, and admits of only one interpretation. Ambiguities do not exist in the rules.

Robust: The rules are consistent and logical, allowing for only a single resolution to be possible for any given set of orders. Paradoxes do not exist under the rules.

Precise: Rules can be cited accurately and quickly. The rules have been structured to group concepts into clear hierarchies and are numbered to provide easy reference (under a numbering system which is distinct from previous numbering systems so as to minimize confusion). Terms within the rules are given specific definition.

Clean: When notes and comments are included, they are clearly separated from the rules themselves. (Notes are identified as such and contained within parentheses. These notes comment upon the rules, but are not part of the rule set.)

Elegant: The rules seek to provide the simplest means to any end. Unnecessary rules are avoided. Duplication of rules is avoided whenever possible.

Traditional: The Alexander Rules do not represent an alteration of Diplomacy, except in those circumstances when it is required to correct a paradox.

Complete: The Alexander Rules contain all the rules necessary to play Diplomacy.

Specifically, here are ways in which the ambiguities and paradoxes mentioned above have been resolved in the Alexander Rules:

Coastal Crawl: As per the most recent edition of the rules (following the GR1971 revision), the definition of a “province” in the Alexander Rules is precise and the coastal crawl is not allowed.

Multiple Convoy Routes: As per the most recent edition of the rules (following the AH1982 revision), multiple convoy routes are allowed and the convoy is not disrupted unless all routes are disrupted.

Kidnapped Armies: The Alexander Rules use a simpler standard than the most recent edition of the rules. If an Army could reach its destination via either a land route or a convoy route, it is assumed to move via the land route unless it is specifically ordered to move “via convoy”. Furthermore, an Army ordered to move via convoy that has all of its convoys disrupted will still attempt to move via land if that is possible.

Brannan’s Rule: As per the most recent edition of the rules (following the intentions of Allan B. Calhamer), a convoyed attack is always considered to have come from the province from which the attacking army is moving.

Paradoxes: The Alexander Rules contain neither the 1976 nor the 1982 anti-paradox rule. Instead, the following rule (IV.5.g) is used:

“RESOLVING PARADOXES: If a convoy would be disrupted if not for the effects of the Army being convoyed, then the convoy is disrupted. If a convoy would not be disrupted if not for the effects of the Army being convoyed, then the convoy is not disrupted even if a Fleet involved in the convoy is dislodged (this is an exception to rule IV.5.c).”

When adjudicating a convoy under this rule, first assume that the convoy fails. If the result of this assumption is that all possible convoy routes are disrupted, then the convoy fails. If the result of this assumption is that the convoy succeeds, then the convoy succeeds (even if the result of that success is that the fleet involved in the convoy is dislodged).

In first and second order paradoxes, this rule results in the Fleet being dislodged and the convoy being disrupted. This is consistent with the 1976 and 1982 anti-paradox rules, but avoids the unwarranted side effects of the 1982 rule.

For Pandin paradoxes (which have never been resolved under an official rule set), this rule creates an exception to the rule that a convoy is disrupted if one of the Fleets involved in the convoy is dislodged. This approach was taken because its result is more consistent with the resolution of analogous orders. The classic Pandin’s Paradox is represented by the moves:

France: A Bre-ENG-Wal
France: F ENG C A Bre-Wal

England: F Wal S F Lon-ENG
England: F Lon-ENG

Germany: F NTH S F Bel-ENG
Germany: F Bel-ENG

As described above. Take the following orders, however:

France: F ENG-Wal

England: F Wal S F Lon-ENG
England: F Lon-ENG

Germany: F NTH S F Bel-ENG
Germany: F Bel-ENG

Resolution: The French attack cuts Wales’ support of London. Germany moves into the English Channel.

Or the following orders:

France: A Yor-Lon

England: F Wal S F Lon-ENG
England: F Lon-ENG

Germany: F NTH S F Bel-ENG
Germany: F Bel-ENG

Resolution: The French attack cuts Wales’ support of London. Germany moves into the English Channel.

Or the following orders:

France: A Bre-MAT-IRI-Wal
France: F MAT C A Bre-Wal
France: F IRI C A Bre-Wal

England: F Wal S F Lon-ENG
England: F Lon-ENG

Germany: F NTH S F Bel-ENG
Germany: F Bel-ENG

Resolution: The French attack cuts Wales’ support of London. Germany moves into the English Channel.

In short, given the following orders:

England: F Wal S F Lon-ENG
England: F Lon-ENG

Germany: F NTH S F Bel-ENG
Germany: F Bel-ENG

The only way that France can attack Wales and not cut the support of London (allowing Germany to move into the English Channel) is if it attempts to convoy an army through the English Channel.

The Alexander Rules solves Pandin’s Paradox by handling the French convoy through the English Channel in the same way as all other French attacks upon Wales: The attack succeeds, the support is cut, and Germany moves into the English Channel. This means that the French fleet in the English Channel is dislodged, so a special exception is made which prevents the dislodgement from disrupting the convoy.

Another way of looking at it: Pandin’s Paradox arises specifically because the Fleet in the English Channel, while being a crucial component of the attack on Wales, does not move out of the English Channel during the attack. As a result, unlike a unit attacking on its own, the convoying Fleet can be dislodged from its province of origin – which would disrupt the convoy and causes the paradox. Similarly, if units elsewhere could attack without moving, you’d end up with all sorts of paradoxes. For example, try to resolve the following attack under the assumption that the army in Bohemia attacks, but doesn’t move and that dislodging the Bohemian army stops it from attacking:

Austria: A Boh ATTACKS Vie
Austria: A Gal S A Boh ATTACKS Vie

Germany: A Sil-Boh
Germany: A Mun S A Sil-Boh

Turkey: A Tyl-Boh
Turkey: A Vie S A Tyl-Boh

Ignore the Austrian attack. Bohemia is the scene of a stand-off, which means it benefits from the Beleaguered Garrison rule and is not dislodged. But when you take the Austrian attack into account, it dislodges the Turkish support from Vienna (cutting it), as a result Germany moves into Bohemia, dislodging the Austrian army, which prevents it from attacking, which prevents it from dislodging the Turkish support… Paradox.

This analogy allows us to precisely identify the two sources of the paradox: (1) The fact that the Austrian army doesn’t move while it attacks. (2) The fact that dislodging the Austrian army causes its attack to fail.

Back to the convoy: Obviously we don’t want the Fleet to move while it is convoying (that would open up a whole new can of worms). Nor do we want to allow a convoy to succeed when the Fleet has been dislodged, because the convoy would then be immune to disruption. The solution? Create a single exception, in which the convoy can succeed even though the Fleet has been dislodged, but only when the convoyed attack is responsible for the Fleet being dislodged. (Which is, of course, exactly what the Alexander Rules do.)

As a final note, it should be understood that accessibility – per se – is not the goal of the Alexander Rules. Simply reading the Alexander Rules is not a good way to learn how to play Diplomacy: The rules are designed for precision and clarity, but not instructional value. The ideal situation would be a comprehensive Beginner’s Guide to Diplomacy using the Alexander Rules – a project which I hope to complete at some point in the future.

ALEXANDER RULES
(PDF)